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ABSTRACT
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) pays special attention to ‘‘so-called’’ policy brokers
when explaining policy change. However, this prominent policy approach neither clearly
defines who the policy brokers are nor identifies under which institutional rules they have an
influence on policy processes and outputs. This article thus formulates two theoretical
hypotheses that complement the ACF and then proceeds to undertake the first empirical
testing of these hypotheses within the Swiss climate policy (1990–2008). The empirical
results show that, in the case under investigation, the strategic interest-based behavior of
two policy brokers (i.e., one public administration and one political party), as well as two
institutionalized veto points (i.e., optional referendum and parliamentary committee), are
crucial factors explaining policy brokers’ influence on policy process and change.
INTRODUCTION
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is a prominent approach used to investigate policy
change and it pays special attention to so-called policy brokers. Following Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith(1993,seealsoSabatierandWeible2007,192), theappropriateunitofanalysis
isapoliticalsubsystemcomposedofparticipantswhoregularlyseektoinﬂuencepolicywithin
that subsystem, such as Swedish nuclear energy policy (Nohrstedt 2009b) or CaliforniaMa-
rineProtectedAreaPolicy (Weible2007) for example.Asubsystemis composedofadvocacy
coalitions whose members can include legislators, agencies, and interest groups, as well as
researchers and journalists; these all coordinate with one another based on shared beliefs.
Policy brokers typically intervene in situations where two or more advocacy coalitions
are in competition (e.g., pro- and contra-nuclear power coalitions [Nohrstedt 2009]; pro-
and anti-MPA coalitions [Weible 2007]) about their beliefs and policy positions. The role
of brokers is to then search for stability in the speciﬁc political subsystem and to mediate
between the opponents in order to make compromise solutions feasible.
Although the ACF was developed in the American pluralist polity, a wider application
in European countries and corporatist political systems can be observed over the last decade
(see Sabatier and Weible 2007 and Weible et al. 2009 for an overview of empirical studies
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applying the ACF). As a consequence of these wider applications, the authors adapted some
concepts to make the ACF better suited to different institutional contexts where consensual
decision making is the rule (Sabatier and Weible 2007) or where political parties are also
key players (Nohrstedt 2009; Weible 2007). Nevertheless, Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen
(2009, 129, 132, and 134–5) explicitly recognized that most ACF applications largely over-
look the role of policy brokers and institutional rules as important components of the ACF.
Concretely, there are still open questions, andACF is lackingwhen it comes to explain-
ing: (1) the mere existence of policy brokers (Who are policy brokers? What are their belief
systems?); (2) their behavior during the policy-making processes (Do they have a strategic
interest-based behavior to increase their power or are they oriented toward the search of
stability within a policy subsystem?); and (3) their inﬂuence on policy outputs in different
political systems (Under which institutional rules do policy brokers have an inﬂuence?).
The ACF revision that we propose here addresses these questions and intends to ﬁll the
signiﬁcantgapbylinkingthefollowingelements: thecompetitionamongadvocacycoalitions
withina subsystem, the roleofpolicybrokers, and the institutional rules framing thedecision-
makingprocess.This is very importantwhen it comes to linkingpolicy subsystems to general
decision-making processes in a speciﬁc polity. Treating both policy brokers and institutional
rules seriously thus allows us to better analyze the nexus between the actors conﬁguration at
thepolicy subsystem level ononehandand thegeneral decision-makingprocesswhich trans-
lates into collective choice outputs on the other. In that context, this contribution is perfectly
congruent with the latest developments of the ACF undertaken by Nohrstedt and Weible
(2010), Sabatier and Weible (2007), Weible (2007), and Nohrstedt (2009).
This article has two aims: ﬁrst, to formulate theoretical hypotheses that complement the
ACF, and that—more generally speaking—take better into account the role and inﬂuence of
policy brokers on policy change under speciﬁc institutional rules, and second, to proceed to
a ﬁrst empirical test of this extended framework by analyzing, in-depth, the brokerage activ-
ities and power games which have characterized the Swiss climate policy during the last two
decades.1 The next sections are structured as follows. In the section ‘‘Policy Brokers within
ACF:TwoNewHypotheses,’’we introduce two additional hypotheses to theACF in order to
deﬁne brokers’ role in policy processes. Section 3 presents the Swiss climate policy-making
process as a case study, used to identify policy brokers and assess their inﬂuence on policy
output. In section 4,we systematically test the two complementary hypotheses by combining
two innovative methods: a quantitative Social Network Analysis (SNA) and a multi-criteria
analysis (MA). Finally, we conclude by suggesting further paths of research, applying the
ACF in various policy domains and countries.
POLICY BROKERS WITHIN ACF: TWO NEW HYPOTHESES
Various different theoretical frameworks dedicate special attention to the role of ‘‘policy
brokers’’ or ‘‘policy entrepreneurs’’ when it comes to ﬁnding explanations for policy process
and output, mainly in so-called cognitive approaches to policy analysis (Baumgartner
1 The data presented here were used for a PhD project (see Ingold 2010, 2008 in French). The aim of these earlier
studies was a policy design and case study analysis of Swiss climate policy. The raw data were reanalyzed in this article
to concentrate on a different aspect, namely the identiﬁcation of brokers in a policy process. The authors consider an
empirical illustration as important when expressing the central claim of this article, for example, a better deﬁnition of
the role of policy brokers within the ACF.
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andJones1993;JobertandMuller1987;Kingdon1995;MintromandNorman2009;Mintrom
and Vergari 1996; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Zachariadis 2007). However, these
schools and approaches deﬁne policy brokers quite differently. Some scholars favor a more
economic way of deﬁning policy brokers, calling them entrepreneurs: policy entrepreneurs
act on a politically proﬁtable opportunity (Holcombe 2002, 143), have a competitive spirit
(Schumpeter 1961), are primarily self-interested, manipulate their environment, and have
leadership qualities (Arce 2001, 124). Other scholars are not so categorical and see entrepre-
neurs as usually creative actors who are neverthelessmotivated by the pursuit of self-serving
beneﬁts (Kingdon 1995, 204). Themultiple streams framework further states that policy en-
trepreneurs play a crucial role in capturing the attention of policymakers andmanipulating it
to theiradvantage(Zachariadis2007,69).Otherscholarsareagaincloser topolicyapproaches
but still highly prioritize the interest-driven characteristics of policy brokers (see, e.g.,
Schneider and Teske 1992, 742), their speciﬁc political skills such as personality, charisma,
and an ability tomanage people (Kuhnert 2001, 21), and to take advantage of inefﬁciencies in
public management (Christopoulos 2008).
All these deﬁnitions are different from the ACF concept, where policy brokers seek
stability and play a crucial role in mediating conﬂicts between competing coalitions. In
ACF terms, the output of a givendecision-makingprocess does not dependonan individuals’
decision but on the interaction of actors’ coalitions. The ACF views the policy process as
a competition between coalitions of actors who advocate beliefs about policy problems
and solutions. Actors are said to build advocacy coalitions independently of their organiza-
tional allegiances or institutional functions. The glue betweenmembers of a coalition is their
shared belief systems (Sabatier andWeible 2007, 195). In the ACF, one distinguishes three
levels of beliefs: the deep core beliefs, involving ontological assumptions; the policy
core beliefs, these being normative beliefs that project an image of how the speciﬁc policy
subsystemought to be and provide the vision that guides a coalition’s strategic behavior; and
ﬁnally secondary aspects, which are preferences related to speciﬁc instruments and policy
proposals in the speciﬁc subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007). If coalition members may
defer in secondary preferences, they tend to agree on core (policy) beliefs (Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith 1993). The goal of each advocacy coalition is to successfully translate its
beliefs into policy programs. Doing so, a coalition can ﬁnd itself in conﬂict with other
coalitionswithdifferentbelief systemswhicharealso trying tohavean inﬂuenceon thepolicy
program. For such conﬂict situations, the ACF developed the concept of learning across
coalitions. Policy-oriented learning is an important aspect of policy change (Weible
2007) and principally concerns the level of secondary aspects of the belief system (Sabatier
1988, 134).
In conﬂict situations, the tendency is for each coalition to ignore or misinterpret one
another; and so-called policy brokers can be identiﬁed as a path to learning processes across
coalitions. A policy broker’s principal concern is to engage in reasonable compromise ﬁnd-
ing which will reduce intense conﬂict (Sabatier 1988, 155). Empirical evidence already
exists about the pertinence of learning across coalitions in conﬂict situations (see, e.g.,
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier andWeible 2007), as well as about the proactive
role of policy brokers (Elliott 2000; Ingold 2008; Jegen 2003). However, there is no explicit
hypothesis within the ACF about the characteristics of policy brokers, their motivations to
enter the policy game, and the institutional rules which shape their activities and success
(see also Mintrom and Norman 2009, 657–8 and 661–2).
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In order to better grasp the concept of policy brokers within the ACF and in policy
process theories in general, we suggest adding two new and complementary hypotheses.
The ﬁrst focuses on the belief system, self-interests, and strategic behavior of policy
brokers within a policy subsystem, this being where we deduce our arguments from re-
garding the above outlined literature about brokers and entrepreneurs in policy processes.
The second postulates that the inﬂuence of policy brokers depends on the institutionalized
veto points constraining the general decision-making process within the political system.
Interests and Strategic Behavior of Policy Brokers (Hypothesis 1)
The original ACF has been criticized for not clearly deﬁning policy brokerswhose ‘‘dominant
concerns are with keeping the level of political conﬂict within acceptable limits, and reaching
some ‘reasonable’ solution to the problem’’ (Sabatier 1988, 141). Furthermore, theACF does
not explicitly consider the (material) self-interests of policy actors and of policy brokers be-
yond their belief systems. Several authors applying theACFhave, in fact, found that interests
could also be a strong driving factor for policy actors to join an advocacy coalition (Ku¨bler
2001; Nohrstedt 2009; Schlager 1995), Sabatier (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 197) himself
admits that, under certain circumstances, interests may play a crucial role. In their own
empirical study of offshore petroleum leasing, Jenkins-Smith and St Clair (1993) also
conclude that interestscanbecrucial: theyadvance that formorematerialcoalitions (typically
motivated by economic purposes), self-interest can be a better indicator for coalition
cooperation than core beliefs.
We question this subordination of interests to policy beliefs and argue here that such
interest-based behavior best characterizes the policy brokers who do not have strong and
cohesive belief systems (for the policy issue at stake) and, thereby, those who do not belong
to one or another advocacy coalition. As argued by Mintrom and Norman (2009, 661),
‘‘some degree of self-interest must be at stake’’ in order to explain why policy brokers
decide to allocate their scarce resources to brokerage activities without any certainty of
their success. If the policy brokers were not motivated by self-interest and, at the same
time, if they did not consider the policy as a fundamental issue for their own core beliefs,
then it would be impossible to understand why they would invest time, expertise, personnel,
etc., in the policy subsystem. The logical assumption which follows must, therefore, be that
policy brokers are rational actors: they mobilize and act strategically (to ﬁnd a compromise
between advocacy coalitions) because their brokerage activities allow them to realize their
own interests. Nonetheless, the content of these self-interests is dependent upon the type of
policy brokers and could not be predeﬁned. However, we expect two types of actors to be
particularly motivated by self-interests rather than beliefs.
On one hand, this seems to be particularly true for political parties that are internally
divided on the issue at stake and who may follow their strategic short-term interest in terms
of internal party cohesion and voters’ maximization.2 For example, Nohrstedt (2009, 12)
2 In general, the ACF pays little attention to political parties in the subsystem; it does not specify how partisan rifts
inﬂuence policy choice and the likelihood for policy change (Nohrstedt 2009, 17). This may be due to the US context of
the ACF development, where political parties are obviously not key policy players. But if the ACF is to be applied to
political systems where political parties are central actors, then it makes sense to consider them explicitly. Note that
a similar suggestion was also made to enlarge the punctuated equilibrium model of Baumgartner and Jones—also
characterized by an US bias—by integrating political parties in this theoretical approach of agenda setting (see in
particular Walgrave and Varone 2008).
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convincingly demonstrates that the strategic interest related to vote maximization was a key
explanation for the Swedish nuclear policy. In 1979, just before the 1980 elections, the
Social Democrats launched a referendum on the phasing out of nuclear power, in order
to avoid an internal party split on this issue and a conﬂict expansion during the electoral
campaign and also, ultimately, to increase its chance of regaining power. Such behavior is
also particularly plausible if a political party (playing a policy broker role) is located in the
middle of the political (left-right) spectrum. It can play a pivotal role in building alternative
winning coalitions, either with left or right parties belonging to competing advocacy
coalitions.
On the other hand, similar reasoning also applies to public administrations. Admin-
istrative agencies when they do not have a speciﬁc mission or mandate in a subsystem,
which would make them belong to a coalition—typically defend more neutral positions
(according to theWeberian ideal-type of rational-legal bureaucracy) and do not have strong
belief systems. Located between conﬂicting coalitions in the policy subsystem, they there-
fore have the opportunity to assume amediating role whichmay increase their own political
power and policy inﬂuence (through additional budget assignments, new implementation
competencies, etc.). Elliott (2000, 89) demonstrates the brokerage role of the Natural
Resource Management Project (NRMP) in Indonesian forest policy. Representatives of
this project are found in ofﬁces belonging to the US Agency of International Development
and to the US Ministry of Forestry. Elliott points out the ideal brokerage location of the
NRMP as it included actors from both major coalitions in the subsystem.
Theﬁrstnewhypothesis(H1)thusreadsas follows: ‘‘Ifpolicyactorshaveeithernostrong
belief systems (on the speciﬁc policy issue at stake), are internally divided (on this issue), or
defendmorecentristpositions than theadvocacycoalitions incompetition, they thenuse their
belief independence to pursue their (material) self-interests and act strategically as policy
brokers to seek stability between advocacy coalitions.’’
In order to test this hypothesis, we suggest the following three steps. (1) Policy brokers
haveﬁrst tobe identiﬁedempiricallyasnot takingpart inorbeingplacedat theborderofoneor
another competing advocacy coalition, as they do not share their respective strong core
beliefs. (2) The empirical analysis should then highlight the material self-interests of policy
brokerswhich lead them to participate actively (despite the absence of strong core beliefs for
theissueatstake)inthepolicy-makingprocess. (3)Finally, thereshouldbeempiricalevidence
about the strategies implementedbypolicybrokers toengage incompromiseﬁndingbetween
advocacy coalitions, while at the same time realizing their own interests.
Institutionalized Veto Points, Devil Shift, and Policy Brokerage (Hypothesis 2)
The ACF is also obviously marked by an underdevelopment when it comes to clarifying the
complex interactions of subsystems (at the policy level), the institutional rules constraining
the decision-making process (at the polity level), and the political actors with the formal
authority to make binding decisions in all policy ﬁelds.3 Sabatier andWeible (2007) have in
fact integrated some thoughts of comparative politics scholars in their latest ACF revision,
in order to deal with less pluralist political systems than the American one. They consider,
3 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 17) adopt a decentralized concept of governance emphasizing problem-solving
structures, rather than formal political authorities and their decisions.
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as variables inﬂuencing policy-making in a subsystem, both the openness of the political
system and the degree of consensus needed for policy change. In short, the institutional
rules inherent to a political system modify the ‘‘political opportunity structure’’ that each
coalition may strategically exploit to promote—or even to impose—its beliefs and policy
preferences. The authors do not, however, formulate an explicit hypothesis regarding the
expected effects of political opportunity structures (which varies signiﬁcantly between
countries and among policy subsystems) on the behavior of advocacy coalitions and on
the speciﬁc role of policy brokers. To ﬁll this gap, we pay special attention to the impact
of opportunity structures and concentrate on institutional rules, which are deﬁned here
as shared prescriptions that are mutually understood and predictably enforced in speciﬁc
situations by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and imposing sanctions (Ostrom
2007, 23). As Ostrom (2005) presents in her typology, different institutional rules exist:
they depend on the concerned tier of decision, such as constitutional collective choice, and
operational decisions (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). We concentrate on the two ﬁrst decision
tiers and adopt a narrower deﬁnition of rules that shape the formal decision-making
arrangement and deﬁne the participation of actors and their access to decision-making
arenas. Such decision-making rules shape opportunity structures that affect, in ACF terms,
the resources and behavior of advocacy coalitions. Institutionalized veto points constitute
one such rule type and are of special interest as advocacy coalitions may activate them to
conserve the status quo.
When developing this discussion further, and in linewith the latest revision of theACF,
we argue that policy brokers are (more) inﬂuential in democracies characterized by several
institutionalized veto points that can be activated by advocacy coalitions. We thus refer to
the theory of veto players, as originally developed by Tsebelis (1995, 289, 2002, 2), which
may be summarized as follows: the potential for policy change decreases with the number of
veto players, the dissimilarity of their respective policy preferences (i.e., the lack of congru-
ence between belief systems in the ACF) and their respective internal cohesion (i.e., the
strength of advocacy coalitions in theACF). Rephrased inACF terms, thismeans that if very
cohesive advocacycoalitionsoppose eachother, thenpolicychange is very improbable as the
dominant advocacy coalition will use institutionalized veto points to hinder any policy
change.
Such a strategy is reinforced by the process of ‘‘devil shift’’ identiﬁed by Sabatier,
Hunter, andMcLaughlin (1987): an advocacycoalitiongenerally tends to see the challenging
advocacy coalition as being more powerful and more evil than it really is. As a corollary, it
perceives itself as being less inﬂuential. This misperception, which is particularly common
in high conﬂict situations, may lead to conﬂict escalation. Furthermore, and in line with the
Tsebelis argument, this devil shift is contingenton thedistance inbelief systemsof opponents
(Weible et al. 2009, 132). In such situations, the use of veto points by the opposing advocacy
coalition to block the decision-making process is (misperceived as) expected. This potential
threat is problematic for advocacy coalitions, as ‘‘actors value losses more than gains’’ and
‘‘remembers defeats more than victories’’ (Sabatier andWeible 2007, 194). Theywill there-
fore eventually accept a negotiated agreement promoted by policy brokers, on the basis that
otherwise their opponents may use veto points in an uncontrolled way.
The combination of both reasons (institutionalized veto points and devil shift) leads to
the active search for a reasonable policy compromise and it is clear that policy brokers are
well positioned to ﬁnd such a compromise solution. By doing so, they prevent the use of
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veto points by one advocacy coalition to the detriment of another and thereby put an end to
the conﬂict escalation. In this context, several authors have empirically identiﬁed or con-
ceptually discussed the important role of brokers which help form compromises between
competing advocacy coalitions that are often in a state of stalemate (Jegen 2003; Nagel
2006; Nohrstedt and Weible 2010).
One aim of this article is to take the link discussed in ACF literature (Sabatier et al.
1987;Weible et al. 2009) between the devil shift situation, the hurting stalemate, and policy
brokers and to empirically test this link. The second hypothesis (H2) reads as follows:
‘‘If the political system offers several institutionalized veto points to advocacy coalitions
engaging in the ‘‘devil shift,’’ then policy brokers attempt to prevent advocacy coalitions
from activating veto points and therefore have a great inﬂuence on the ﬁnal policy output.’’
Robust testing of this secondhypothesis includes four steps. (1)The identiﬁcation of the
institutionalized veto points that might be used by advocacy coalitions. (2) The empirical
investigation should then demonstrate how the advocacy coalitions gradually engage in
a ‘‘devil shift’’ through the threat of activating these veto points. (3) Furthermore, it has
to be shown how policy brokers prevent this conﬂict expansion and the effective use of veto
points. (4) Finally, the analysis should demonstrate that the policy actors belonging to the
advocacy coalitions acknowledge the activities of policy brokers and value their mediating
rolewithin the subsystem. Inotherwords, a counterfactual reasoning is required toensure that
the policy outputs would have been different without the intervention of the policy brokers.
In the next section, we present a case study on the Swiss climate policy, in order to test
these two hypotheses which aim at extending the ACF.
CASE STUDY: THE SWISS CLIMATE POLICY (1990–2008)
Since theearly1990s,Switzerlandwasa strongpartner in theelaborationand implementation
process of theUnitedNations Framework onClimate ChangeConvention. In 2003, Switzer-
land signed theKyoto Protocol, underwhich it committed to reduce 8%of its greenhouse gas
emissions by 2012 compared to 1990 emissions.4 This decision clearly represented a ‘‘policy
stalemate’’ (Sabatier andWeible 2007, 206) for the Swiss climate policy, insofar as all policy
actors involved in the policy-making process viewed the continuation of the status quo
as unacceptable. However, much earlier than this international commitment, the Swiss gov-
ernment had already planned a national climate mitigation strategy. In 1995, it launched the
project of the CO2 law, which was introduced in 2000. The ﬁrst implementation phase of
the law relied on voluntary measures and, in case of the failure of this self-regulation, on
a subsidiaryCO2 tax. This initial step is an exampleof a successful public-private partnership
between the Swiss Federal Administration and economic sectors.5 Nonetheless, the 10%
emissions reduction goal of the law could not be reached by the nonmandatory instruments
during this period. Thus, after 2002, a tax incentive on CO2 emissions should have been
introduced. However, the political negotiation about this more constraining instrument
strongly divided the political elite and led to an intense conﬂict expansion. The policy instru-
ments adopted for the second phase in 2005 were a CO2 tax on combustibles (implemented
4 CO2 contributes to more than 80% of Swiss greenhouse gas emissions. CO2 is emitted by three main sectors:
transport, households, and industry; each one contributes almost by one-third to the overall emissions.
5 One example of such a public-private partnership is the target agreement for CO2 emissions reduction between the
Swiss Agency for the Environment and the Swiss cement industry (http://www.detec.ch).
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in 2008) and a climate penny on motor fuels (implemented since 2005). This was not the
expected solution and it marked a clear departure from the incentive CO2 tax (on both com-
bustibles andmotor fuels) thatwas initially deﬁned as a subsidiary instrument in theCO2 law
of 2000.
In relation to theanalysisof the twosuccessivepolicyoutputs reviewedabove(voluntary
agreements and subsidiary CO2 tax, and the CO2 tax on combustibles and climate penny
on motor fuels), the following questions emerge: How can we explain the unpredictable
policy change that happened in the Swiss CO2 law after the year 2000? Did policy brokers
inﬂuence the policy output? If so, which institutional rules allowed them tomediate between
thepro- and contraCO2-tax coalitions?Weanswer these questions and argue in the following
paragraphs that the two additional hypotheses, as presented above, constitute an added value
to understanding broker actions in the case of the Swiss climate policy.
Data and Methodology: SNA, MA, and Content Analysis
The data analyzed in this case study is based on 50 face-to-face interviewswithin 34 organ-
izations and was collected during a PhD project between the years 2005 and 2006 (Ingold
2010, 2008). We also rely on a systematic content analysis of several ofﬁcial documents
and, foremost on all opinions expressed by the policy actors during the pre-parliamentary
consultation procedures (for a detailed presentation of this data, see Ingold 2008). In accor-
dance with the ACF, we studied nearly two decades of Swiss climate policy and identiﬁed
coalitions, power relations, and broker presence. To better understand policy change in the
Swiss CO2 law, all empirical tests concerned the two outlined decision-making periods: the
designand implementationof theﬁrst phaseof theCO2 lawbetween1990and2000and, then,
the more recent developments between 2000 and 2008.
The ﬁrst stepwas to identifymembers of the so-called ‘‘Swiss climate policy elite.’’We
relied on the classical combination of positional, decisional, and reputational approaches for
the deﬁnition of the elite. In linewithKnoke et al. (1996, 7), formal organizations rather than
individuals stand in the foreground of today’s politics and form advocacy coalitions. This
claim is of particular interest here because in the formal pre-parliamentary consultation
phase,6 policy actors express their policy preferences that are then taken into account by
political ofﬁcials.7
6 As stated in the Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure (CPA, SR 172.061), such procedures are mandatory
when drafting amendments to the Constitution or provisions of Federal Acts. As stated in the same Act, their speciﬁc
purpose is of allowing cantons (national subunits), political parties, and interest groups to participate in shaping of
opinion and decision-making process of the Confederation and to guarantee the feasibility of implementation and
public acceptance. They take thus place before the decision making of Parliament and Government.
7 We are aware of the fact that individual survey respondents tend to replicate their personal belief systems, rather
than that of their organization and that individuals are the ones who learn and act in a policy process. However, we
controlled this by four empirical means: ﬁrst, senior representatives of every organization were identiﬁed to ensure that
individuals knowing the internal structure of the organization and experienced with the communication of its ofﬁcial
viewpoint were involved in the survey. In most cases, executive members, such as directors and presidents, were
therefore interviewed. Second, every interview question started with the sentence ‘‘in the viewpoint of your
organization’’ to make clear that the individual evaluation was not of interest to us. Third, individual survey answers
were then compared to the opinion expressed in ofﬁcial documents. Where necessary, the interview partner was
solicited a second time to explain possible differences between their personal answers and the ofﬁcial statements. And
fourth, where an aggregate actor showed an internal split of belief systems or a change in policy preferences over time,
two or more representatives were interviewed. This is the reason, why for 34 organizations 50 interviews occurred.
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In accordance with the recommendation of Stokman (2004, 23), we apply a two-
dimensional approach concentrating on both structure and content. To empirically test the
relational proﬁle among actors and to investigate dominance, we applied SNA as a method-
ological adjunct to the theoretical tenets of the ACF. SNA provides an impressive toolbox
for empirical analysis of social network structures and their relevance for opportunities
and behavioral choices of actors. However, to take into consideration actors’ belief systems,
wehavecombinedSNAwith twomorecontent-drivenmethodologies: thecontentanalysisof
theconsultationproceduresforbothperiods,aswellasanMAforthesecondperiod. Inorder to
reconstructactors’policypreferences, thisMAtakes intoconsiderationtwodifferent levelsof
beliefs: ﬁrst, it weighs different criteria relevant in the speciﬁc subsystem (e.g., normative
beliefs, such as the importance of ecological effectiveness or competitiveness of Swiss
economy in the internationalmarket, thus relevant in the speciﬁc subsystemof Swiss climate
policy). Second, actors involved in decision making also evaluate policy instruments
(e.g., secondary aspects/instrumental assumptions that represent a translation of policy core
beliefs). This methodological combination (SNA,MA, and content analysis)8 allowed us, in
most cases, to test the concepts of theACF twice, by applyingSNAandMA/content analysis.
Identification of Two Advocacy Coalitions
Following traditional SNA (Wasserman and Faust 1994), two measures are important in
order to identify coalitions in a conﬂict network: structural equivalence and density.
Participants tooursurveywereasked toindicate theconvergenceanddivergencerelations
they shared with all other actors within the policy elite. With the gathered data, structurally
equivalent actors could be identiﬁed: structural equivalence puts all actors having the same
conﬂict proﬁle into the same group.9 Actors of the same group are not necessarily linked
by a relation, but they occupy the same position in the policy subsystem. This measure trans-
lates the ACF concepts in a pertinent manner as it structures a subsystem following actors’
conﬂicting opinions about a speciﬁc policyﬁeld. In the twoconsidered decades ofCO2 law in
Switzerland, three main groups can be identiﬁed: a ﬁrst group, dominated by private sector
representatives (pro-economy group); a second group, mainly constituted by science and
Federal administration representatives (intermediate group); and a third group, dominated
by left parties and green non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (pro-ecology group).
Groups of structurally equivalent actors are, however, not necessarily advocacy co-
alitions: following the ACF, members of a coalition must have a certain degree of internal
coordination. Translated into SNA terms, convergence (and not divergence) relations
should prevail among actors of the same coalition (Fischer 2003; Ingold 2008; Sciarini
1994). Density measures indicate if actors are linked through a majority of convergence
relations (see table 1).
A positive density shows dominance of convergence relations compared to divergence
relations. Density above 0.5 is considered as strong convergence and density above 0.25 as
8 Weible (2007, 113–4) recommended combining network data (to identify coalitions) with qualitative data gathered
through documents, questionnaires, or interviews to identify beliefs, behavior, and strategies. In our case, MA
operationalizes coalitions’ belief systems. This datum was gathered through 50 interviews on questionnaire basis.
9 Structural equivalence was calculated using the software StOCNET: StOCNET 1.7 including BLOCKS 1.6,P2 4,
PACNET, SIENA 2.4a, Ultras 1.2, and ZO 2.3 (6.0 Mb, February 8, 2006) developed by Stokman F., Snijders T., van
Duijn M., ICS/University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
Ingold and Varone Treating Policy Brokers Seriously 327
medium (Sciarini 1994). Within-group densities are outlined in the diagonals of table 1;
they are of interest here to see if members of the same group share most notable conver-
gence relations and can thus be identiﬁed as coalitions.
Thepro-economygroupandthepro-ecologygroupshow,forbothstudyperiods,amedium
to strongpositive density among theirmembers (0.236/0.355 for the pro-economygroup; 0.65/
0.292 for the pro-ecology group). The intermediate group, however, is not a coalition in our
subsystem: divergence relations invalidate convergence relations.
Following theseﬁrst results of the network analysis,wehave twomain coalitions during
both analyzed periods of the CO2 law. The very stable and homogenous pro-economy
coalition contained 11 representatives from Swiss industry, transport, and right parties. This
coalition furthermore counted among its members, the inventors of the climate penny,
the Swiss Petrol Union, and the Touring Club. The pro-ecology coalition grew in numbers
between the ﬁrst and the second phase and, from 2000 contained, the Federal Ofﬁce for the
Environment (FOEN), representatives from left parties and green NGOs. The intermediate
group could not be identiﬁed as an advocacy coalition per se. Between the two analyzed peri-
ods, it lost four members to the pro-ecology coalition and in the second phase included
14 members mainly representing the Federal Administration10 and scientiﬁc institutions.
The Christian Democratic People’s Party (PDC), a center-right party often defending
a political compromise, was also member of this intermediate group.
The following section of our study reconstructs coalitions looking at actors’ beliefs and
policy preferences (Brecher et al. 2010); it should strengthen the results found in applying
SNA.11 For the ﬁrst period between 1990 and 2000, a content analysis of the ofﬁcial policy
positions held by the various policy actors was conducted to identify coalitions’ preferences
about policy instruments. We principally looked at the actors’ statements during the pre-
parliamentary phase and, speciﬁcally, at the statements made during the 1996 consultation
procedurewhere theﬁrstprojectof theCO2lawwasdiscussed(FederalCouncil1997).For the
Table 1
Densities from 1990 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2008
Pro-economy Intermediate Group Pro-ecology
1990–2000
Pro-economy .236 2.051 2.164
Intermediate group 2.046 .039 .10
Pro-ecology 2.309 .333 .65
2000–08
Pro-economy .355 2.32 2.101
Intermediate group 2.143 .011 .56
Pro-ecology 2.606 .111 .292
Note: The density and centrality measures were calculated using the software UCINET: UCINET 6 forWindows developed by Borgatti,
Everett, and Freeman (Analytic Technologies, Harvard). This datum was presented earlier (see Ingold 2010, in French) in a case study
presentation about instrument design in Swiss climate policy. Compared to that earlier work, the data serve here as a ﬁrst test of the
additional hypotheses suggested by the authors. The aim of this contribution is thus to show how policy brokers can be conceptualized
under the ACF and, furthermore, be empirically identiﬁed. The empirical test is of particular interest here as the authors are not making
a simple theoretical claim.
10 All Federal agencies participating in the Swiss climate elite (except the FOENwhich is member of the pro-ecology
coalition) belonged to this intermediate group.
11 See also Ingold (2011) for a detailed discussion about ally/opponent networks in relation with belief consistency
among coalition members.
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second period between 2000 and 2008, we applied anMA to identify actors’ policy core and
secondary aspects.12MA is used to undertake a comparative assessment of alternativemeas-
ures, in our case policy instruments. The key output is a ranking of instrument preferences of
every actor and coalition.13
Four criteria were deﬁned as policy core indicators: environmental effectiveness, eco-
nomic effectiveness, equity, and competitiveness. In turn, the four policy instruments, all
possible options for the second phase of the CO2 law, were deﬁned as secondary aspects:
voluntary agreements, CO2 tax, climate penny, and tradable permits. After weighting all
four criteria, the participants to the survey gave marks to the four instruments, while still
taking into account the four evaluation criteria.14 Coherence in policy core and secondary
aspects was assessed by investigating whether a dominant preference structure among co-
alition members could be identiﬁed (see hereafter).
The two coalitions which had already been identiﬁed by applying SNA made coherent
choicesincoreandsecondarybeliefs(table2): followingofﬁcial statementsof the11members
in the pro-economy coalition, all of thempreferred, ﬁrst and foremost, voluntary agreements
in the ﬁrst phase of the CO2 law (Federal Council 1997; Lehmann and Rieder 2002).
15 In
the second phase, the pro-economy coalition preferred the climate penny: this policy instru-
ment was ranked ﬁrst and the tax was ranked as last by all 11 members participating in the
survey.16 These 11 justiﬁed their choice with the criteria of economic effectiveness and/or
competitiveness in the market.17 Since 1990, the pro-ecology coalition preferred the CO2
tax (Federal Council 1997). This was conﬁrmed for the second phase by the MA analysis
where all members of the pro-ecology coalition ranked the tax ﬁrst (5 members of the
pro-ecology coalition ranked the tax as preferred option together with other policy instru-
ments; the climate penny was however always ranked last). They justiﬁed this choice in
the second phase by using the criteria of environmental effectiveness.18 Again, the interme-
diate group did not fulﬁll coalition’s characteristics: its members provided a very heteroge-
neous assessment of evaluation criteria,19 which meant that they had weak coherence about
theirpolicycore.Coherenceinpolicycorebeliefs isacrucialconditionfor theidentiﬁcationof
acoalition inACFterms(SabatierandJenkins-Smith1993).Onthe levelof secondaryaspects
of the belief system, almost all actors of the intermediate group preferred, among other
12 The survey took place in fall 2005. Actors’ policy preferences were thus investigated via the MA for the second
phase. As it is problematic to ask survey participants about their past policy preferences (interviewees tend to replicate
current preferences in the past), preferences for the ﬁrst phase were investigated via a content analysis of the opinions
expressed by all policy actors during the consultation procedure. This documentary analysis was also duplicated for the
second phase of the law.
13 Concretely, we applied Electre II, which calculates an index of concordance and an index of discordance. This
enables us to evaluate each pair of instruments evaluated by every survey participant and weighted by each evaluation
criterion. For a detailed outline of the method and the underlying mathematical algorithm, see Ingold (2008, 210) and
Scha¨rlig (1985).
14 Every instrument received a mark from 1 to 6 for its performance to fulﬁll a speciﬁc criterion. Speciﬁcally, every
instrument received four marks, one for each performance criteria.
15 They approved the law only because of the subsidiary characteristic of the CO2 tax.
16 Apart from one actor, who mentioned having equal preference for all policy instruments.
17 Two actors evaluated the economic effectiveness, one actor the competitiveness, and seven actors both criteria as
the most important for Swiss climate policy. Only one actor mentioned preferring the environmental effectiveness.
18 Eight actors evaluated the environmental effectiveness as the only and most important criterion. One actor
mentioned all criteria being important.
19 The 14 actors of the intermediate group combine the four evaluation criteria in 8 different ways. No preferred
criterion can thus be identiﬁed.
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instruments, the CO2 tax.
20 This phenomenon can be explained in relation to the similar po-
sition all these actors held in the network (same structural equivalence).
On thebasisofSNA,documentarycontent, andMAanalysis of actors’ opinions,we con-
clude thatwehad twocompetingadvocacy coalitions (pro-economyandpro-ecology) during
the considered decade of CO2 law in Switzerland.
21 The output used today is made up of the
CO2 tax on combustibles and the climate penny onmotor fuels, each instrument having been
preferredbyonemaincoalitionbut rejectedbytheother.Nocoalitionwasdominantenoughto
impose its policypreferences as theunique solution inSwiss climate policy. Furthermore, the
international pressure of theKyoto Protocol,where Switzerland committed by its ratiﬁcation
to reduce 8% of its CO2 emissions, was not perceived as an external factor for policy change.
First,weobserve achange in secondaryaspects; external factors under theACFare, however,
of higher relevance in core belief change. And second, the choice of the climate penny, eval-
uated as an instrument with weak ecological effectiveness and thus unable to reach the
Table 2









Number of actors 11 actors 18 actors 5 actors



















CO2 tax CO2 tax
2000–08
Number of actors 11 actors 14 actors 9 actors
Type of actors 8: Industry, transport
2: Right parties















Climate penny CO2 tax
(among other instruments)
CO2 tax
Note: A detailed list of all organizations that participated in our survey and were members of the Swiss climate elite can be found in
Appendix. Again, MA results were gathered in the above-mentioned PhD project. For more details about policy instrument design and
preferences, see Ingold (2010) and (2008, in French).
20 In the ﬁrst phase between 1990 and 2000, they already preferred this instrument. And as a result of the MA, 13 out
of 14 mention to prefer the tax among the other three instruments.
21 Our empirical results conﬁrmed the conclusion of previous research on the Swiss energy policy elite (see in
particular Varone and Aebischer 2001, Kriesi and Jegen 2000, 2001).
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emissions’ reduction goal (see Thalmann and Baranzini 2006), is further proof of the weak
inﬂuence of international pressure on national policy design in the analyzed case. Finally, if
international climate policy and the Swiss commitment in theKyoto Protocol had had a large
impact on national policy making, actors greatly involved in international decision making,
such as the FOEN, the Environment Department (DETEC), or several other scientiﬁc insti-
tutions,wouldmost probably have been empowered in the subsystem.However, these actors
did not all hold a dominant position in the network and again the international arena did not
play a key role in the deﬁnition of the policy compromise.
As coalitiondominance and international pressure donot explain policy change in second-
ary aspects of Swiss climate policy, in the following section, we investigate the role of policy
brokers in the facilitation of ﬁnding a compromise between the two competing coalitions.
Identification of Two (Potential) Policy Brokers
The conﬂict between the pro-economy and the pro-ecology coalitions was shown by two
main indicators. First, both coalitions competed about core beliefs and policy preferences
and, second, they shared signiﬁcant conﬂict relations with one other as indicated in table
1.22 In such cases, the ACF focuses on to the concept of learning across coalitions and the
presence of so-called policy brokers: brokers mediate between the coalitions in order to ﬁnd
stability and to bring a feasible policy compromise to its success (Sabatier 1988, 133s). By
testing if brokers were present in the CO2 law decision-making process, one may thus an-
swer the question about how today’s output of penny and tax was built and decided upon.
SNA andMA are again combined to identify policy brokers in the Swiss climate policy
subsystem. A prominent SNA concept used to identify gatekeepers within a network is
betweennesscentrality:betweenness centralitywasdevelopedbyFreeman (1979)andshows
howmany timesanactor is locatedbetween twoother actors.23Ahighbetweenness centrality
means that anactor controls informationﬂowin thepolicynetworkand therebyobtains a stra-
tegic and powerful position. In additional to this, reputational powerwas also deduced from
the survey: every participantwas asked to indicate themost important actors in Swiss climate
policy during the two study periods.
FollowingtheACF’sbrokerconcept,andtranslatedtonetworkterms,onlyactors linking
members fromboth coalitions are able to obtain amediatingposition in the subsystem.More-
over, in order to mediate between different conﬂicting beliefs and to search stability in the
subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), policy brokers should defend more centrist
beliefsandholdamoremoderateposition.Theseassertionsareoperationalizedbyagainlook-
ing at our MA results and focusing on actors with moderate belief systems.
Whether actors of all kind belong or do not belong to advocacy coalitions,24 the con-
sensus style of policy making in Switzerland encourages administrative agencies to play the
22 In the period 2000–08, for example, the density of the conﬂict relations between the pro-economy and the pro-
ecology members is of 20.1 and from pro-ecology to pro-economy of 20.6. (see table 1)
23 The corresponding question asked during the survey was: ‘‘With which actors did your organization collaborate
closely during the elaboration (1990-2000) and the recent implementation (2000-2008) of the Swiss CO2 law?’’
24 ‘‘The distinction between ‘advocate’ and ‘broker’, however, rests on a continuum. Many brokers will have some
policy bent, whereas advocates may show some serious concern with system maintenance. The framework merely
insists that policy brokering is an empirical matter that may or may not correlate with institutional afﬁliation: Although
high civil servants may be brokers, they are also often policy advocates—particularly when their agency has a clearly
deﬁned mission’’ Sabatier (1993, 27).
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role of policy brokers (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 215). Moreover, researchers and
scientiﬁc staff are also typically able to absorb (or even bring in) technical information
(Sabatier and Weible 2007, 192): these actors are therefore predisposed to holding more
neutral positions in a subsystem. This is why we concentrate here on the intermediate
group, which is dominated by the two types of actors of interest: public administration
and science. Members belonging to the intermediate group are in a better position to be
identiﬁed as policy brokers: as actors outside a competing coalition, they would be in a prof-
itable position to mediate. But, as their betweenness centrality indicates (see numbers in
table 3 below), they are poorly integrated and related to few others. They are, therefore, not
predisposed to being policy brokers.
TheSwissFederalOfﬁceofEnergy (SFOE) is an exception; SFOEcouldbe identiﬁed as
a potential policy broker, having a high reputational power and a high betweenness centrality
and linking all actors in the network, includingmembers of both competing coalitions. SFOE
was avery strongpartner of theSwiss governmentwhen it came to choosing the policyoutput
of theCO2 law.When the government saw the dilemmabetween the two polarized coalitions
and theirdifferenceconcerning thepolicy instruments, theSFOEproposed topresent amixof
tax on combustibles and climate penny onmotor fuels.25 Furthermore, the SFOE abandoned
itsownpreferences(taxandtradablepermits) inorder toﬁndapoliticalcompromiseandcould
therefore be viewed as a real policy broker in the Swiss Climate policy.
Table 3












SFOE 66 1.1 83 6.1
PDC 53 0 72 13.7
AenEC 6 0 74 1.1
DETEC 22 0 72 1
SECO 38 4.1 23 1.5
FFA 25 0.5 14 0.1
OEBU 16 1.8 23 1.5
USS 6 0 3 0
Equiterre 13 0 6 0.3
Infras 31 0 43 0.3
Prognos 31 0 49 0
NCCR 0 0 0 0
Note: Reputational power: the higher the number, the more important an actor is viewed as by all other actors of the network.
Betweenness centrality: the higher the number, the more central an actor is, linking members of the network that would not be related to
each other without him. ‘‘nbetweenness’’ indicates the normalized betweenness centrality in %; 100% corresponds to the maximum
possible betweenness centrality in the whole network. In the 1990–2000 collaboration network, the maximum betweenness was 17.5%
obtained by the FOEN. The mean is 1.8%, all actors located above have a considerable betweenness centrality. The highest betweenness
in the 2000–08 collaboration network was obtained by the WWF (29.4%), but the collaboration relations mentioned by this green NGO
were rarely conﬁrmed by the other actors in the network, so this result must be analyzed with prudence. The mean is 6%.
25 This situation resembles what Mintrom and Norman (2009, 653) describe in their recent work about policy
entrepreneurship and policy change as follows: ‘‘Risk aversion among decision makers presents a major challenge for
actors seeking to promote signiﬁcant policy change.’’
332 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
The second actor identiﬁed as a policy broker candidate was the PDC. The role of the
PDCwasapriori not as active as theSFOE’s.Nonetheless, in thepre-parliamentarydecision-
makingphase, itwas alreadyoneof the only actorswhich chose the solutionof amixbetween
the preferred instrument of the pro-ecology coalition (CO2 tax) and the preferred instrument
ofthepro-economycoalition(climatepenny).Theseﬁndingswereconﬁrmedduringtheinter-
views with two PDC representatives, where they insisted that their contacts with members
from the two main advocacy coalitions were intense and important (Ingold 2008). Further-
more,PDC,asagovernmentalparty,hadasigniﬁcant inﬂuenceon thedecisionsof theFederal
Council, and the government itself was more comfortable with its ﬁnal choice of a mix
between two instruments with the support of one of its member’s parties.26
To summarize the results of the SNA, the MA and the documentary content analysis,
we may conclude that we have identiﬁed two potential policy brokers (SFOE and PDC)
who were involved in the search for stability in the second phase of the Swiss CO2 law and
helped, as stated by the ACF, to ﬁnd a feasible policy compromise.
TEST OF THE TWO EXTENDED ACF HYPOTHESES
Nonetheless, it is still necessary that we clearly demonstrate how these two actors actually
acted as policy brokers and thereby test our two research hypotheses (see the procedure of
testing presented in sub-sections 2.1. and 2.2.).
SFOE and the PDC as Strategic Policy Brokers
Regarding Hypothesis 1, our empirical data have shown that neither the SFOE nor the
PDC belonged to either of the two competing advocacy coalitions (pro-economy versus
pro-ecology)andneitherhadstrongbeliefs in favorofoneor theotherpolicy instrumentunder
discussion. During the interview with a directorate member of SFOE, it became clear that
SFOE actually preferred an overall CO2 tax in combination with tradable permits (see also
MAresults). But as the directoratemember pointed out: ‘‘At somepoint, ourAgency became
aware that a pragmatic solutionwas needed. The opponents to the tax didmobilize all resour-
ces to promote the climate penny. In order to prevent a deadlock in the process and to comeup
with a feasible solution, our ofﬁcemade the suggestion to the Federal Council to consider the
combination of a tax on combustibles and a penny on motor fuels.’’27
In a similar vein, the PDC supported the instrument mix from the early stage of the pre-
parliamentary phase. Its motivation, however, was a different one: the PDC was internally
split: some of its members preferred the CO2 tax and the others supported the climate penny.
This division was conﬁrmed during our interviews, where one of the party members
26 The Swiss government (Federal Council) is constituted by sevenmembers from four parties: two Social Democrats
(PSS), two Free Democrats (PLR), two representatives of the Swiss People’s Party (UDC), and one Christian Democrat
(PDC). The seats in the National Council (lower Chamber of the Parliament) are divided among the most important
political parties as follows: Left: Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (PSS, 19.5% of votes; 43 seats) and Green
Party of Switzerland (GPS, 9.6% of votes; 20 seats); Center: PDC (14.5% of the votes ; 31 seats); Right: Free
Democratic Party and Liberal Party (PLR, 15.8% of votes; 31 seats) and Swiss People’s Party (UDC, 28.9% of votes;
62 seats). This division shows the pivotal role the PDC may play between left and right parties. Its votes are necessary
to create winning coalitions both on the left (PSS and Green Party) or on the right side (PLR and UDC) of the partisan
spectrum.
27 Interview with a directorate member of SFOE, the November 20, 2005, in Bern, Switzerland.
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mentionedpreferring the tax,whereas another indicatedapreference for thepenny.28Finally,
the PDCdid not opt for amajoritarian vote among itsmembers but rather preferred to support
the combined policy mix, as was conﬁrmed by the president and PDC representative of the
Parliament Committee for the Environment.29 This representative also pointed out that—
during the parliamentary discussion—it became clear that the climate penny had far more
chances to pass the decision-making process than the tax. An instrument mix seemed thus
the best solution why the PDC made a Parliamentary intervention, suggesting the gradual
introduction of the tax.30 These statements show that it was not especially difﬁcult for the
federal agency or for the center-right party to abandon parts of their own policy preferences
to play the role of mediator.
Furthermore,wecanalso identify the self-interestsof these twopolicybrokers inorder to
explainwhy theydecided to invest resources inbrokerage activities. TheFOENis the leading
agency in Swiss climate policy. It was responsible for the CO2 bill formulation, for ofﬁcially
representing Switzerland in the international Kyoto negotiations and, also, was foreseen as
the implementer of the subsidiary CO2 tax and the related tradable permits. The SFOE was
therefore a rather peripheral actor within the Federal administration, even if this agency was
co-responsible for monitoring the voluntarymeasures implemented by private actors during
theﬁrstphaseof the law. In thesecondphase, theSFOE’s interestwas togainmorepower,new
implementing competencies, and more resources as the budget of SFOE’s main Program to
promoteenergyefﬁciencyandrenewableenergies(calledEnergySwiss)wascutby40%atthe
start of the secondphase of theCO2 law.
31Directly related to this, the SFOEhad an interest in
promoting the climate penny,whichwas planned to be implemented by a private foundation.
TheSFOEhasa long traditionofcollaborationwithprivateactors, principally those related to
the implementation of the EnergySwiss Program. In this regard, one of SFOE’s most impor-
tant partners is the Energy Agency representing the Swiss private sector. As the directorate
member of SFOEmentioned in our interviews, the SFOE saw the climate penny as a possible
means of strengthening the collaboration with the Energy Agency and also its own Energy
Efﬁciency Program.32 Therefore, it clearly promoted an instrument mix which strengthened
its own policy position. The PDC was also motivated by self-interest, namely vote maximi-
zation. The PDC did not have very clear beliefs in the CO2 case but had an interest in putting
a political decision forward in order to gain power as a pivotal party in Swiss parliament and
government. This point was again addressed in the interviews: the PDC representativemade
clear that itwas expected that he, as president of the Parliamentary committee,would suggest
a solutionwhich represented theopinionof themajorityof committeemembers.His goalwas
thus to achieve vote maximization within both the committee and Parliament, by supporting
a combined solution of tax and penny.
Finally, we can also observe the concrete power strategy that both policy brokers put
in place. The SFOE used two strategies to push forward its compromise solution and to
directly inﬂuence the policy output. First, during the internal consultation of public
28 Interviews with two parliamentarians of the PDC, on the November 11 and the December 6, 2005, respectively,
were held in Bern, Switzerland.
29 Interviews with a parliamentary representative of the PDC, on the December 6, 2005, in Bern, Switzerland.
30 The PDC suggested linking the amount of the tax to the inﬂation. The Parliament ﬁnally decided on a gradual
introduction, but not in relation to inﬂation, but in relation to the achieved CO2 reductions. The less CO2 that is reduced,
the higher the tax price.
31 SFOE: http://www.bfe.ch.
32 Interview with a directorate member of SFOE, the November 20, 2005, in Bern, Switzerland.
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administration units (i.e., mandatory internal consultation of all Federal agencies which are
concerned by a bill project), it suggested that the tax and penny should be presented to the
actors of the formal consultation procedure (i.e., mandatory external consultation of all
stakeholders outside the public administration) not only separately but also in combination.
Second, during an informal meeting with the Swiss government, the SFOE suggested
choosing the policy mix of tax on combustibles and penny on motor fuel, despite poor
support for this policy solution during the formal external consultation procedure (Ingold
2008). The SFOE thus acted to smooth the progression in a nonvisible (internal consultation
and informal meeting with Federal Council), but very inﬂuential manner. We can therefore
conclude that the SFOEwas sufﬁciently institutionally implicated, informed, and consulted
during the pre-parliamentary phase to pass its message to the Swiss government. Nonethe-
less, it also managed to maintain a sufﬁcient distance from advocates of both competing
coalitions, in order that it might control the process from a somewhat neutral position.
The strategy of the PDC relies on inﬂuencing the decision of the Federal Council. As
a governmental party, it could not only inﬂuence actors during the pre-parliamentary phase
butevenparticipate in theﬁnaldecisionof theFederalCouncil. It is true that inﬂuencecan take
place in the whole network, but decision making is reserved for those with the authority to
make binding decisions. The second strategy of the PDC was to inﬂuence the ﬁnal decision
through different venues in Parliament. First, and as was mentioned above, the leader of the
Parliamentary committee responsible for theCO2 lawwas aPDC representative and thus had
the opportunity to directly integrate the idea of an instrument mix into the message of the
committee to the overall Parliament (see also discussion of hypothesis 2).33 Second, during
Parliament’s plenary sessions, the PDC was the only actor that openly supported the mix
between tax and penny. Different PDC representatives therefore took the opportunity to
encourage this compromise when deadlock was reached among the parties of the left and
parties of the right—supporting an overall CO2 tax and penny onmotor fuels, respectively.
34
In sum, all three steps could be veriﬁed and hypothesis 1 is thus corroborated for the
case of Swiss climate policy: the two brokers SFOE and PDC did not take part in either of
the two coalitions; both had a self-interest in promoting a policy compromise, and both
ﬁnally pursued a strategy to directly inﬂuence the ﬁnal decision.
Optional Referendum and Parliamentary Committee as Institutionalized Veto Points
We now turn to the testing of hypothesis 2 regarding the expected high impact of policy
brokers in political systems with a high number of institutionalized veto points and a ‘‘devil
shift’’ process between advocacy coalitions. To that end, we ﬁrst identify the main institu-
tionalized veto points that could be used by advocacy coalitions. Switzerland represents an
emblematic case of consensus democracy (Lijphart 1999; Neidhart 1970). Speciﬁcally, pol-
icy actors opposing a policy change may use direct-democratic instruments to challenge the
dominant advocacy coalition. A small minority of voters or parliamentarians may overturn
policy decisions made by the parliamentary majority through an optional referendum.
Uncertainty for the dominant advocacy coalition is thus introduced to the policy-making
33 The opinion of the responsible committee is important as in these committees all parliamentary parties are
represented. As the committee members count as experts on the speciﬁc question, the overall Parliament tends to
follow the committee’s opinion or,at the very least takes it into consideration for the ﬁnal vote (see more details below).
34 Ofﬁcial parliamentary statements are found under http://www.parlament.ch.
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process throughthestrategicuseofdirectdemocracy(Vatter2009).Thethreatof launchingan
optional referendum, and thus blocking any changes to the (policy) status quo, acts like
a Damocles sword threatening the whole decision-making process (Papadopoulos 2001);
as a consequence, it leads to power-sharing institutions and large governmental coalitions
(Neidhart 1970).
Further, the policy considerations of all policy actors (e.g., political parties, interest
groups, trade unions, environmental associations, etc.), which might otherwise make use
of the optional referendum after the parliamentary phase, are already integrated at the
pre-parliamentary phase of the legislative process—where the initial policy proposal is
elaborated—inorder to avoid an expost referendumwith anuncertain outcome. In a nutshell,
weconsider theoptional referendumasakey institutionalizedvetopoint thatmightbeusedby
competing advocacy coalitions. Tsebelis (2002, 125) labeled this situation as a ‘‘veto player
referendum’’as thedecisiontoholdareferendumbelongstooneofthevetoplayers(i.e.,oneof
thecompetingadvocacycoalition in theACF).Wemustalsohighlightanothervetopointused
during the parliamentary stage of the law-making process (Tsebelis 2002, 99–105). Before
entering the plenary agenda of the Federal Assembly, a legislative proposal is ﬁrst discussed
within a specialized parliamentary committee. In Switzerland, there are 12 permanent
committees (since 1992), each responsible for one policy ﬁeld. Seats within each committee
are distributed according to the strength of parliamentary groups (i.e., the number of MPs
representing political parties in Parliament), and the committee’s debates are generally
organizedbymutual agreement betweenparties.Acommittee is free to rewrite governmental
proposals and has control over its own timetable. Parliamentary committees de facto have
strong (deﬁnition) power as the Federal Assembly eventually adopts some 95% of the
committee proposals sent to the plenum (Lu¨thi 2007, 128). Thus, MPs who belong to one
or another advocacy coalition, whereas simultaneously being a member of a committee,
may strategically use this arena to politicize the policy issue and to block, at least for some
time, the decision-making process.
This outline of possible veto points in Swiss decision-making processes shows on the
one side that our case study constitutes an ideal case in which to test the second hypothesis
presented here; but on the other side, it also points out the limitations of this research in
generalizing to cases where institutionalized veto points are not as easily identiﬁable or
present at all.
The second element of interest used to test the second hypothesis is the existence of
a‘‘devil shift’’situationintheSwissclimatepolicycase.Wehavethreesourcesof information
toinvestigatedevilshift:First,SNAresults;second, thepolicypreferencerankingprovidedby
MA; and third, an in-depth analysis of parliamentary and interview statements. Table 1 again
shows the increase in conﬂictive relations (negative density scores) between the two main
coalitions during the second phase of the CO2 law. This phenomenon is accompanied by
a signiﬁcant increase in convergence relations between the members of the pro-economy
coalition. Second, the ranking of coalitions’ preferred instruments showed that no member
of thepro-economycoalitionwouldprefer thetaxandnomemberofthepro-ecologycoalition,
the climate penny. There were, therefore, clearly adverse interpretations made by the
coalitions of one another’s policy preferences and beliefs.
Third,byanalyzingthestatementsof thedifferentparties inparliamentaryplenarysessions,
it isclearthatthenegotiationsbetweentherightandtheleftreachedadeadlocksituation.Noparty
considered the (partial) adoption of another coalition’s preferredmeasure. In these discussions,
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one also notices that supporters of the climate penny were less aggressive and alarmed than tax
supporters.Thereasonfor thisis that thedecisionofthegovernment tointroduceataxwouldonly
be the ﬁrst step. In a second step, the Parliament then has to decide about the tax price. As stated
several times during the interviews, Parliamentmembers knew that they could block thewhole
process by simply maintaining a refusal to accept the (revised) tax price suggested by the gov-
ernment.Bothbrokers,butprincipallythePDC—dividedbetweenthe twocoalitions—knewof
theextent of the conﬂict and the ‘‘devil shift’’ betweenbothcoalitions, andcould strategically
actaccordingly.
In the above outlined analysis, it was clear that if the Federal government introduced the
tax on motor fuels (instead of the climate penny), the risk would have been very high that
representatives of the pro-economy coalition would have blocked its introduction in the par-
liamentary phase during the tax price negotiations. To avoid the use of veto points during the
parliamentary phase, the two policy brokers acted early and engaged in an active search for a
policy compromise in the pre-parliamentary phase.As outlined above, the SFOEcontributed
bysuggesting the integrationof the instrumentmix to thegovernmentprior to thegovernment
launching the formal consultation procedure. The PDC on its side took the opportunity to
support this instrument mix from a very early stage in this consultation.
Finally, itwasclear that severalactors in thesubsystemrecognized thebrokeragepotential
ofPDCandSFOE.Although thesixparliamentary representatives fromthe left (PSSandGreen
Party) and the right (PRL andUDC)would have preferred that their supported instrument (and
nocompromise solution, as suggestedby thePDC)passed thedecision-makingprocess, during
the interviews, they all recognized the important role that the PDC played in the consensual
policy solution ﬁnding (see also its reputational power, table 3).
ThebrokerageroleofSFOEwasrecognizedinanevenmoreexplicitmanner:apartfromﬁve
members of the twomain coalitions including the FOEN,35 the SFOE recognized its brokerage
role by considering amixof pennyand tax in both the pre-parliamentary phase and in theﬁnal
governmental decisionas a ‘‘strategic andpragmatic act ofmediation.’’36Moreover, thehead
of theMinistry of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communication (DETEC) and gov-
ernmentmemberconﬁrmedina letter to theauthors that theeveningbeforehemadepublic the
decisionof thecombined taxandpenny introduction,hehad invited theDirectorofFOENand
two private sector representatives from the Petrol Union and the Swiss Business Federation
(economiesuisse) tohisofﬁce inBern.Hisaimwas to investigate ‘‘howthese important actors
would accept the mixed solution between tax and penny.’’ Furthermore, the Minister also
mentioned that SFOE, although not the leading agency in CO2 issues, was also invited
and that its presence was ‘‘crucial as it was originally SFOE’s suggestion to combine
these instruments.’’37 The vice-president of SFOE further conﬁrmed the participation in this
informalmeetingandhighlightedhis role asmediatorknowingof ‘‘both situations, theoneof
theFOENandtheDETEC,wanting the introductionof the taxaswrittenin the law,andtheone
of the penny inventors, wanting to avoid a tax on motor fuels.’’38
In sum, we identiﬁed that both advocacy coalitions had the opportunity to address
institutionalized veto points and that they were engaged in ‘‘devil shift’’ and that both
35 Author’s results from interviews with FOEN, economiesuisse, Swissmem, scientiﬁc expert, and AEnEc conducted
in fall/winter 2005.
36 Interview with a directorate member of SFOE, the November 20, 2005, in Bern, Switzerland.
37 Letter from the Minister to the authors from December 2, 2005.
38 Interview with a directorate member of SFOE, the November 20, 2005, in Bern, Switzerland.
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policy brokers engaged in conﬂict prevention, which was also recognized by several actors
in the subsystem. On the basis of these empirical elements, we conclude that hypothesis 2
was conﬁrmed within the Swiss climate policy system.
Added Value of the ACF to Analyze Policy Brokerage
The testingofbothof thehypotheseshasdemonstrated theaddedvalueofanACFapproach in
comparison to other approaches, such as those suggested by interest-based theories. First, the
ACFconcentrates on the functional role of policybrokers in a subsystem, namely their ability
tonegotiateandcompromisebetweencompetingcoalitions.Theirposition inapolicyprocess
thus goes beyond the realization of personal self-interests. This point is clearly conﬁrmed in
ourcasestudywhere the twopolicybrokers’behaviorandactionswerecharacterizednotonly
by pure self-interests but other varying factors.
Second, interest-basedpolicytheories(pluralism,rationalchoice,etc.) tendtofocusonly
on a restricted number of self-interested, sometimes even opportunistic stakeholders. The
ACF, however, takes into account all actors constituting part of the subsystem, concentrating
foremostontheirbeliefsystems.Again, thispoint iscrucial ifonewants toidentifybrokersand
analyze compromise ﬁnding: policy brokers tend to have a larger network horizon (including
different actors from the two ormore competing coalitions and not only thosemotivated and
activethroughpersonal interests) than,forexample,purelystrategicandself-interestedpolicy
entrepreneurs.
Finally, and this argument found a fundamental split in the pro-economy coalitionwithin
Swissclimatepolicy: the industry,ascombustibleconsumer, hadcompletelydifferent interests
than the transport representatives and petrol importers – typically motor fuel consumers. An
interest-based approach would have argued that the ﬁrst would not support the climate penny,
but rather be against a combustible tax and in favour of a motor fuels tax. Only the in-depth
analysis of these actors’ belief systems, as suggested by theACF, could ﬁnally identify the fact
that all these actors formed part of the same coalition, despite the fact that theywere differently
affected by the different policy instruments of the CO2 law.
CONCLUSION
This article focusedon the role of policybrokers inmediatingbetweenadvocacy coalitions in
a policy subsystem; this being an area neither theoretically discussed nor empirically tested
enough under the ACF. For this reason we added two hypotheses to concretize the broker
position and role in a political conﬂict: both hypotheses directly addressed former critics
to the ACF, which stated that this framework underestimates actors’ interests and strategic
behavior compared to beliefs; and that it does not pay enough attention to institutional rules
(i.e., veto points) under which policy brokers successfully inﬂuence policy change. Concep-
tual and empirical insights presented in this article have however implications beyond the
ACF literature and constitute an added value for future research on the role and identiﬁcation
of brokers in policy process analysis.
TakingtheexampleofSwissclimatepolicy,weprovidedan insight intohowtwobrokers
acted according to their institutional positions (as public administration and governmental
political party), and helped to avoid one or the other coalition from using either veto points
inParliamentor theoptional referendum, inorder toblock thepolicydecisionandlead to issue
expansion and conﬂict escalation. Brokers’ strategic behavior, knowledge of the situation
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(i.e., ‘‘devil shift’’ between advocacy coalitions) and self-interests also had an impact on
theextentof their inﬂuencein theﬁnaloutputdesign.Theseconclusionsclearlysupport recent
empirical analysis aimed at the improvement of the ACF hypotheses and methodology
(Nohrstedt 2009;Weible 2007). These conclusions are furthermore entirely compatiblewith
previous studies that used the ACF to analyze policy change in Switzerland.39
We therefore conclude that our analysis constitutes a strong starting point, which can be
used to consider bothACF theory revision andmethodological challenges to conﬁrmor falsify
ourresearchresults.There ismoreoveraneedtohaveanalyticalcategoriessuchasvetopoints to
provide a general perspective on the impacts of institutional rules on advocacy coalitions and
policybrokers strategies.40Several authorshadpreviously suggestedcombining the literature
on policy entrepreneurship, theACF and other approaches on policy change (e.g., incremen-
talism, policy streams, institutionalism, punctuated equilibrium, epistemic communities or
policy design; seeMintrom andNorman 2009; James and Jorgensen 2009;Meijerink 2005).
However, these authorsdidnot explicitly consider thevetoplayers’ theoryas agoodmeansof
complementing the ACF and explaining under which institutional rules policy brokers are
successful. This is not particularly surprising as the veto players theory mainly focuses on
policy stability.Nonetheless,we suggest that a serious considerationof institutionalizedveto
points (e.g., multi-party government, federalism, courts decisions) is a crucial explanatory
factorwhich explains the inﬂuence of policy outputs, particularly in case of ‘‘devil shift’’ and
conﬂict escalation. Of course, it is still an open question as to howpolicy brokers are likely to
act in a political systemwhich does not offer several institutionalized veto points.Wemight
assume that policy brokers would have little inﬂuence on the policy output in such a case.
Our study also tackled amethodological challenge by introducing formal SNA forACF
hypotheses testing.Ofcourse,SNAcannot replaceacarefulanalysisofactors’belief systems.
In order to understand the source of conﬂict and to identify the coalition structure in the sub-
system, documentary content analysis and MAwas necessary in our empirical study. Other
techniques are also available that can be used to identify core and secondary values of belief
systems (e.g., discourse analysis, survey, interviews; see therefore also Brecher et al. 2010;
2009; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier andWeible 2007). However, our main ar-
gument is that a combination of both SNAand another technique ensures amore robust iden-
tiﬁcationof both advocacycoalitions andpolicybrokers.41 It ismoreover important to couple
the (mainlystructuralandstatic)analysisofanadvocacycoalitionat thesubsystemlevel,with
a ‘‘process tracing’’ approach of the whole decision-making process. This triangulation of
methods allows for the simultaneous consideration of the relative impacts on policy outputs
of belief systems, material (self-) interests and institutional variables (such as veto points).
Finally, it seems evident that the two hypotheses that we proposed should be tested in
different policy subsystems and in various national contexts, in order that their general
validity may be evaluated. The two independent variables might be necessary but not
39 For example, Ku¨bler’s ACF application to Swiss drug policy (2001) also points to the fact that institutional rules
(i.e., direct democracy) are important when it comes to explaining major and minor policy changes (Ku¨bler 2001). The
author demonstrates how a popular initiative ‘‘Youth without drugs’’ (‘‘Jugend ohne Drogen’’) constituted a threat for
the ‘‘harm reduction advocacy coalition’’ which then engaged a learning process in order to stay in power. This was
a typical situation of what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) call learning within coalitions.
40 This point seems even more relevant for studies comparing different countries and/or policy domains.
41 In that way, brokers can be deﬁned as a structural group (such as members of an advocacy coalition). Their
speciﬁcity is that they neither structurally (relational proﬁle; structural equivalence) nor ideologically (belief system)
belong to any advocacy coalition.
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sufﬁcient conditions for the impact of brokers on policy change. We thus suggest three
further research steps to build upon our limited case study.
First, the Swiss Climate policy is a ‘‘success story’’ of both policy brokerage and pol-
icy change. It would be very beneﬁcial to expand the empirical basis by also considering
negative cases. In other words, it would be valuable to conduct systematic comparisons of
empirical cases characterized by both an active role of policy brokers and either policy
change or policy stability. Explaining both change and stability (despite intense policy bro-
kerage) within an integrated theoretical framework is still a major challenge (Mintrom and
Vergari 1996).
Second,we shouldbetter isolate the ‘‘net impacts’’ of policybrokers onpolicyprocesses
and outputs. In particular, we have to test empirically if the individual qualities of successful
policy brokers (as proposed for example byMintrom and Norman 2009; Goldﬁnch and Hart
2003, but also Beach 2004 or Tallberg 2004 in the ﬁeld of EU politics) represent a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition for engineering policy change. For theACF in particular, this applies
to systematically comparing policy brokers activities (in a ‘‘devil shift’’ situation) with other
conditions affecting the likelihoodof policy change throughcross-coalition learning (such as
a hurting stalemate, a high technicality and tractability of the issue at stake, the existence of
a professional forum, etc.). The framework for studying collective learning in collaborative
arrangements developed by Gerlak and Heikkila (2011) could be a promising approach to
better isolate the speciﬁc impact of policy brokers from the inﬂuence of additional variables
impactingboth, learningprocesses (i.e., changeof someelement incoalitions´beliefs system),
and learning outputs (i.e., change in policy instruments).These authors argue that boundary-
spanningactorswhoareconnected tomultiplemembersofapolicydomainrepresentacrucial
factor fostering collective learning processes (Gerlak and Heikkila 2011, 18).
Third, and in linewith the recommendation ofMintrom andNorman (2009, 661–2), we
argue that cross-national and cross-sector studies of policy brokering are urgently required.
Thenumerous case studies published so far suffer fromconceptual andmethodological prob-
lems concerning the impacts of speciﬁc institutional rules on policy brokers’ inﬂuence. If
institutional factors do matter (as also postulated in the extended version of the ACF; see
Weible 2007, 114), then the challenge is to better link policy games at the subsystem level
with politics and institutional rules framing the general decision-making process (see also
Nohrstedt andWeible 2010). The conventional classiﬁcation of countries according to their
institutional features (e.g., Lijphart 1999) is of little value in explaining the ﬁnal substantive
content of public policies. Varone et al. (2006) have, for example, compared the policies
regulating biomedical technologies adopted in nine European countries, Canada and
the USA. Thisstudy clearly demonstrated that there is no convergence in the content of
the policies adopted by consensual versus majoritarian countries, or in federalist versus
unitary state structures, etc. To draw valid inferences about the nature of policy process
and outputs in different political systems, we suggest always combining actor-based condi-
tions(i.e.,beliefsystemofadvocacycoalitionsandinterestofbrokers)withinstitutionalrules-
based conditions (i.e., veto points). Future empirical studies might thus apply the following
research designs: the comparison of two policy sectors (different actors conﬁguration) in the
same country (similar veto points); or the comparison of the same policy domain (similar
actors conﬁguration) in different countries (different veto points).
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